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REPLY BR1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Bezzant fails to acknowledge that this case is not about political speech or a public
issin

II is iilniiil Ddentiint Ibiic//aiilMI IIKIIU iously and unnecessarily attacking

Plaintiff, William T. Jacob ("Jacob"), a private citizen. Jacob nv\w w nK i piiiiblii iv.m .
Bezzant did not demonstrate that the district court's dismissal of Jacob's claims
ect, particularly when accepting Jacob's allegations as
true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his fa\ ai ! \v IIM , iinttH dov1. "V - K! In e
was published in the process of government. Moreover, even if Bezzant could make such
nig, he has conceded that Jacob's claims were not wholly without merit. Thus
sanctions were not justi.fi.ed cvn 1 »i I:u \ "I»

>.

Bezzant has also failed to show, when accepting all of Jacob's factual allegations
as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, that Jacob's §1983 claims were
insufficiently pled such that sanctions were justified. Further, Bezzant has failed to rebut
Jacob's as-applied challenge under the Open Courts provision.
ARGUMENT
I. BEZZANT HAS FAILED TO SHOW THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL
UNDER THE ANTI-SLAPP ACT IS CORRECT WHEN VIEWING ALL FACTS
AND INFERENCES IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO JACOB
The district court dismissed Jacob's claims under the anti-SLAPP Act (the "Act")
on the ground that Bezzant's Notice was "protected political speech." Rl 825:12-14. The
district court's decision to award Bezzant attorneys' fees was based upon this finding. Id;
BRIEF OF APPELLANT ("Br. Appt."), Addendum C.
As the proponent of the motion for judgment on the pleadings/motion for
summary judgment ("Motion"), Bezzant must show the district court's ruling was correct
when accepting Jacob's factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences
in Jacob's favor. In re. Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 353 (Utah 1997).1 Bezzant was

This Court recently articulated a departure from this heightened standard of review when
considering whether a statement is susceptible to a defamatory meaning. O 'Connor v.
Burningham, 2007 UT 58,1fi[26-7, 165 P.3d 1214. Therefore, the analysis in this section
does not apply to that portion of the court's ruling. However, under the analysis in
O'Connor the district court in this case should have found the statements did convey a
defamatory meaning. The publication context was an environment of fear, retaliation and
abuse by public officials against private citizens, and a deliberately malicious "Urgent
Election Notice," "Apology," and "Correction," initially drafted and approved by public
official and candidate Tom Hunter and published by Bezzant to preserve his friendship
and business relationship with Hunter and to avoid being sued. Thus the context was an
effort to please AFC public officials by holding Jacob out as an object of public
contempt, hatred and ridicule. This issue will be addressed in greater depth below.
2

also required below to present clear and convincing evidence Jacob filed his claims to
interfere with or chill Bezzant's participation in the process of government. Utah Code
Ann. §78-58-104(l)(b). Bezzant has failed to meet or to acknowledge these burdens.
Jacob, a private citizen and business owner whose reputation for integrity,
honestly, and sound judgment is essential to the success of his business, established a
long-standing confidential relationship with Defendants in 1993 whereby Jacob
periodically provided Defendants with information about current events in exchange for
Defendants protecting Jacob's anonymity. R280:5, 11; R1528. It can reasonably be
inferred from these facts that Defendants knew Jacob highly valued his anonymity. Thus,
it is also reasonable to infer that when Defendants publicly disclosed Jacob's name in the
Urgent Election Notice ("Notice"), they did so with malice and a with purpose to hold
Jacob out as an object of public ridicule, contempt, and hatred. That Bezzant did not
publish the Notice to influence the decisions of any government branch, but did so
because Tom Hunter threatened to sue him, and to preserve his friendship and business
relationship with Hunter, must not only be accepted as true, but are facts admitted on the
record. R280:39-40; R385; R1457 (Br. Appt. Addendum G).

Although Defendants now refer to the Notice as the "Editorial," this is a semantic
manipulation of unfavorable facts to fit favorable law. Defendants entitled it the "Urgent
Election Notice", the "Correction," and the "Apology" until Jacob filed his Complaint.
Defendants now strategically avoid these titles. The Notice was published via mail, doorto door delivery, and the non-editorial section of the Citizen's website. The undisputed
facts that Hunter wrote the first draft and that both he and Storrs approved the final draft
undermine any claim the Notice was an editorial, and further reveal Bezzant's claim that
he was merely exercising his own free speech rights to be false on its face. Rl529-30.

3

That Bezzant maliciously identified "William T. (Bill) Jacob" and falsely accused
him of producing false information and of negative campaigning to hurt candidates must
also be accepted as true, as well as the reasonable inference that Bezzant intended to
make Jacob a target of public ridicule, contempt, and hatred. R1529-30; R2609-10.
Had the district court accepted Jacob's factual allegations3 as true and drawn all
reasonable inferences in his favor, the court should have concluded the Act did not apply
and that Jacob's claims had both legal and factual merit. Bezzant's failure to show the
court's ruling was correct when accepting Jacob's allegations as true defeats his claims.
A.

Bezzant fails to show that a lengthy procedural history is clear and
convincing evidence that Jacob's primary purpose was to interfere with or
chill his right to participate in the process of government.

The district court acknowledged Bezzant had to "demonstrate that the primary
purpose of Jacob's lawsuit [was] 'to prevent, interfere with, or chill [Bezzant's] proper
participation in the process of government.'" R1825:13 (quoting §78-58-104(2)).
Bezzant had to make this showing by clear and convincing evidence (§78-58-104(l)(b)),
which is obviously a greater burden than a mere preponderance standard. The district
court's conclusion that this matter was a SLAPP action was based on the following:
[T]he evidence presented to this Court intimates that Jacob filed the litigation at issue
for the purpose of chilling Bezzant's political speech and thereby preventing or
interfering with Bezzant's proper participation in the process of government. The
lengthy procedural history set forth in Section I of this opinion supports the
proposition that Jacob intended to use this litigation as a means of punishing Bezzant
for Bezzant's publication of the political speech contained in the election notice.
3

It is particularly appropriate for the district court accept all factual allegations as true
because the anti-SLAPP Act stays all discovery upon the defendant's motion to dismiss.
Utah Code Ann . §78-58-104(l)(a).

4

R1825:14. A lengthy procedural history4 is not clear and convincing evidence of a
primary purpose to interfere with or chill government participation; because Bezzant
cannot argue that it is, he argues instead that Jacob's good faith is immaterial. BRIEF OF
APPELLEE ("Br. Appe.") at 44-5.
Moreover, many litigated cases are lengthy for legitimate reasons. A long history
is often the rule rather than the exception and does not, standing alone, support a finding
of abuse by either party. In fact, it may support the opposite finding as diligent litigants
narrow the issues for trial. Cases settle all the time because litigants agree to avoid
typically lengthy litigation and its associated costs. In any event, a lengthy procedural
history is insufficient to establish a primary purpose to interfere with or chill Bezzant's
right to participate in the process of government by clear and convincing evidence.
B.

Bezzant fails to address his own admissions that prove he was not
participating in the process of government, arguing instead for a broad
construction of the Act that exceeds its plain language and purpose.

Bezzant's affirmations in his Answer that his Notice was published to provide
"information and commentary" to American Fork City ("AFC") residents and to
"apologize" to Hunter and Storrs (R385,fflf16-20) constitute judicial admissions.
4

Not only is Bezzant's Statement of Facts inaccurate and misleading, he fails to inform
the Court about his own significant contributions to the procedural history of this case.
He was the first party to initiate and aggressively pursue costly discovery. See e.g. R26;
R54; R56. Bezzant's Motion also should have been filed even before his Answer, not
nearly two years (R426) after raising the Act as a defense. R385. Utah Code Ann. §7858-104 (a party files a motion for judgment on the pleadings which the district court must
determine "as expeditiously as possible"). Bezzant's lengthy delay in filing his Motion,
during which both parties' legal costs increased substantially, is his own fault, not
Jacob's. While Jacob attempts herein to clarify additional facts Bezzant has

5

Bezzant also admitted he published the Notice to preserve a friendship and business
relationship. R1457. Notwithstanding his hope that this Court will ignore these
statements, they are admissions that summarily defeat his claim that his Notice was
participation in the process of government, and now estop him from making that claim.
Bezzant claimed Jacob's complaint was filed "as a retributive action designed to
punish Bezzant's use of political speech and his legitimate participation in the political
process." R1825:12 (emphasis added). This political activity, even if true, does not fall
under the statutory definition for "process of government." This Court's analysis of the
judicial privilege in O'Connor v. Burningham, supra, is analogous. For that privilege to
apply, material must be presented in the course of a judicial proceeding; the material
must have some reference to the subject matter of the judicial proceeding; and the party
claiming the privilege must be acting in a recognized capacity in the judicial proceeding.
Id. Similarly, for statements to be made in the "process of government," they must be
presented as part of a legislative or executive proceeding; the statements must reference
the subject matter of the government proceeding; and the individual making the
statements must be acting in a recognized capacity in the proceeding.
Bezzant's argument that an election is an activity leading up to future unknown
government decisions is unpersuasive. He asks this Court to extend the meaning of
"process of government" to statements that may have some unintended and unforeseen
influence on future nebulous government decisions. This would require a broad

misconstrued in his favor, to preserve needed space for argument, Jacob has attached
Addendum C, a comparison between several of Bezzant's facts and the record.
6

construction of the term beyond its plain language and would be unwise. It would also
violate rules of statutory construction.
Because this Court will read the Act "as a whole and interpret its provisions in
harmony with other provisions of the statute and with other statutes under the same and
related chapters" (Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, f7, 162 P.3d 1099), Bezzant's Notice cannot
be considered government participation as a matter of law. This is true even if the facts
and their reasonable inferences are not construed in Jacob's favor.
Section 78-58-102(2) defines "government" to include a branch or other
government body, an employee, or a person acting in their official capacity. Notably,
"government" does not include an election campaign or political speech. Section 78-58104(3) states, "Any government body to which the moving party's acts were directed or
the attorney general may intervene to defend or otherwise support the moving party"
(emphasis added). Interpreting these provisions in harmony with the statutory definition
for "process of government," Bezzant's conduct had to be directed toward a branch,
agency, department, or person acting in their official capacity for the Act to apply.
Bezzant's Notice was not directed to any government branch or person acting in
their official capacity, nor was it intended to influence any legislative or executive
decision. As discussed in Jacob's opening brief, the fundamental purpose of anti-SLAPP
legislation is to protect private citizens' rights to petition government by giving them a
tool to defeat meritless lawsuits brought by large private interests for the sole purpose of
chilling or interfering with that fundamental right. Bezzant asks this Court to extend the
scope of the plain language of Utah's Act beyond this explicit purpose.
7

In his brief, Bezzant claims publication of the Notice constituted his proper
government participation for three reasons unrelated to the fundamental right to petition
government. First, he inaccurately5 claims the Notice "addressed a significant issue
before American Fork City regarding the interpretation of its ordinances"; second,
Bezzant claims the Notice "was directly responsive to Jacob's Flyer on the same subject
which Jacob has expressly claimed to be his own participation in the process of
government"; and third, the Notice "was published in the course of an election campaign"
which would eventually lead up to government decisions. Br. Appe. at 23-4.
None of these activities involve "process of government" nor do they involve the
First Amendment right to petition government. Therefore, they hardly merit a response.
The mere fact that a publication includes a legal issue does not bring it within the Act's
scope, particularly when the legal issue is not even pending before a government body.
Otherwise, every publication about abortion or gay rights, for example, would be deemed
participation in the process of government. It would be both unwise and inaccurate to
construe every such publication as an attempt to influence government decisions. If the
Act encompassed every publication involving a public issue, whether or not it was
responsive to another publication, it would chill potential litigants from seeking a judicial
remedy for defamatory statements couched therein. Such a broad construction would
exceed the purpose of the Act and be subject to abuse by would-be defamers.

5

Bezzant misconstrues this fact. Any government decision to ignore Hunter's and
Storrs' conflicts of interest were made long before Bezzant published his Notice.
Addendum C, YP, 5. Interpretation of the ordinances relating to Hunter's and Storrs'
conflicts of interest was clearly not pending before the AFC government.
8

Bezzant's claim that the Notice constituted government participation because it
was published during an election campaign argues for an overbroad definition that is
anticipatory of future government decisions. Under his rationale, any publication that
could have any unintended impact upon election outcomes would be government
participation because election outcomes affect government decisions. So do births,
deaths, marriages, divorces, career choices, and illicit encounters between state senators
and private citizens in airport bathrooms. However, defamatory statements about private
citizens made in these contexts are not included within the scope of the Act simply
because they may have some unpredictable impact on future government decisions.
Bezzant's "process of government" analysis is also misleading as he attempts to
shoehorn unfavorable facts within the statutory definition. He claims the Notice was "an
activity leading up to the decisions that would be made by the newly constituted City
Council... he was [] influencing those decisions in the most direct way a citizen can - by
engaging in political speech directed at who those decision-makers should be." Br. Appe.
at 31. This self-serving claim suggesting an intent that Bezzant never had is misleading
and false. R1457 (Br. Appt, Addendum G).
Also inconsistent with the argument that his intent is immaterial (Br. Appe. at 28,
44-5), Bezzant claims for the first time it is "undisputed" that he delivered the Notice to
Mayor Ted Barratt, "the public official with the authority to enforce those Ordinances as well as the other members of the City Council." Br. Appe. at 25, 29. This new claim
is both disputed and demonstrably false. R516, Tab E, 136-38 (Deposition testimony of

9

Ted Barratt that he did not discuss the Notice with anyone and he did not see it until after
it was delivered to his home in the same manner it was delivered to other AFC residents).
Thus, the delivery of Bezzant's Notice to the AFC mayor or other public officials
was incidental, not intentional. Bezzant's contrary suggestion lacks candor. While his
misconstruction of the facts is misleading, it also evidences the lack of factual support for
a finding that Bezzant's Notice was intended to influence government decisions.
Bezzant also relies upon the district court's factually unsupported finding that the
Notice was directed to "those in the city's executive and legislative positions who had the
power to disqualify candidates" (Br. Appe. at 25), which Jacob challenged in his opening
brief. Bezzant's only response to Jacob's challenge is an unsupported assertion that it "is
both factually incorrect and uncivil." Br. Appe. at 25. While Jacob intended no
disrespect to the district court in pointing out there are no facts to support this
inconsistent finding,6 Bezzant can cite no evidence to support it.
Even the Rhode Island statute Bezzant mischaracterizes as "similar" to the Utah
provision (Br. Appe. at 33) expressly precludes such abuse. While it is broader than the
Utah Act because it gives conditional immunity for statements "made in connection with
an issue of public concern," it does not protect statements that are a "sham." R.I. Gen.
Laws §§9-33-1 and 9-33-2 (Addendum A). "Sham" statements are defined as:

6

The Notice was addressed, "To: All American Fork Residents" (Rl 825:9). "Bezzant's
publication of the election notice was primarily directed to citizens of American Fork
who had a direct interest in the upcoming election." R1825:16. AFC public officials
testified there were no City Council discussions about the conflict of interest issue, and
Ted Barratt refused to allow private citizens to discuss the issue during those meetings.
R516, Tab E, at 109-1; see also, citations in Paragraphs 3 and 5 of Addendum C.
10

(1)

Objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable person exercising
the right of speech or petition could realistically expect success in
procuring the government action, result, or outcome, and

(2)

Subjectively baseless in the sense that it is actually an attempt to use the
governmental process itself for its own direct effects. Use of outcome or
result of the governmental process shall not constitute use of the
governmental process itself for its own direct effects.

Under these provisions, not only would Bezzant's intent be highly significant, his
statements are both objectively and subjectively baseless. He admittedly did not expect
them to influence government decisions. R1457. That AFC government officially
supported Hunter's and Starrs' candidacies while turning a blind eye to the conflicts of
interest is undisputed. See, e.g., R516, Tab E, 109-10. Assuming without agreeing that
"process of government" should encompass any statement about an election, Bezzant
used that process not to influence government decisions, but to avoid being sued and to
preserve his friendship and business relationship with the public official candidates.
Therefore, Bezzant's Notice is a "sham" under the Rhode Island statute.
Further, the Rhode Island case Bezzant cites, Global Waste Recycling, Inc. v.
Mallette, 762 A.2d 1208 (R.I. 2000) (Addendum B), is inapposite to the facts here and
further demonstrates how and when anti-SLAPP legislation is properly applied - when
large and powerful private interests bring meritless lawsuits against private citizens to
harass and intimidate them because they threaten their pecuniary interests.
Global Waste was in continuing violation of government directives to clean up its
property. It was improperly stockpiling hazardous construction waste and demolition
material. Many local residents, spearheaded by Marcia and Henry Mallette, feared these

11

hazards were harming the community and signed a petition seeking government
enforcement against Global Waste. When a fire broke out on the property spewing
billows of black smoke into the surrounding community, a news reporter interviewed
several local residents, including the Mallettes, who were quoted as saying Global Waste
was burning lead and asbestos. Global Waste sued the Mallettes for defamation and lost
on a motion for summary judgment brought under Rhode Island's anti-SLAPP statute.
In upholding the district court's ruling, the Rhode Island Supreme Court first
reprimanded Global Waste for lying in their brief about their noncompliance and noted
its violations were a well-documented matter of public concern. The Rhode Island court
specifically found Global Waste's ongoing violations "might constitute an actionable
private nuisance to the Mallettes and their neighbors." Id. at 1213.
Unlike this case, Global Waste was a large private interest suing private citizens
who had petitioned the government in a manner adverse to its pecuniary interests. The
Mallettes comments, which were elicited during a highly publicized fire, did not
unnecessarily identify a private citizen or make him an object of public contempt. Nor
were they carefully crafted to preserve a friendship and business relationship. Unlike the
Utah Act, the controlling statute in Global Waste expressly includes matters of public
concern under its broad language. However, even under this broad language that is
advisedly7 not a part of the Utah Statute, Jacob is not a matter of public concern.

7

In interpreting statutory language, it is assumed that each term was used advisedly. Sill
v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, ^[11, 162 P.3d 1099. Had the Utah legislature intended matters of
public concern to be included within the scope of proper participation in the "process of
government," it would have said so.
12

Unlike the Mallettes, Bezzant ridiculed a private citizen to please AFC public
officials. Bezzant's proposed broad construction of "process of government" exceeds the
Act's plain language and its underlying purpose. Adopting it would create confusion in
the law and a concomitant chilling effect on those who would otherwise legitimately seek
redress for injuries to their reputations, in violation of Article I, Section 11 of the Utah
Constitution. See Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. Ill P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) (implicitly
supporting a narrow construction of any statute restricting remedies to persons who have
been injured in their reputation).
Bezzant's anti-SLAPP counterclaim is an abuse of the intent and purpose of the
Act. This dispute was never about what Bezzant said about Hunter or Storrs or the
applicability of the AFC ordinances to their respective candidacies. This lawsuit was not
designed to punish Bezzant's use of political speech or to chill or interfere with Bezzant's
government participation. Had Bezzant not identified Jacob and called him a liar, there
would be no complaint against Bezzant. But not naming Jacob would have defeated the
primary purpose of the Notice, which was to appease Hunter and Storrs by exposing
Jacob to public contempt, hatred and ridicule. The Act was never intended to shield such
statements from liability. Rather than address his personal and unnecessary attack on
Jacob, Bezzant attempts to hide behind the purported public issue.
As a matter of fact and law, Bezzant was not participating in the process of
government when he falsely accused Jacob of lying about the issues to harm candidates.
These statements did not involve an exercise of free speech or the right to petition
government. However, it is not Jacob's burden to prove Bezzant was not participating in
13

the process of government, even though he has. Rather, it is Bezzant's task to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that even when accepting all of Jacob's
factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, Bezzant's
publication of the Notice was a proper participation in the process of government. Not
only has Bezzant failed to meet this burden, he cannot meet it on these facts.
Like the district court below, Bezzant has failed in his brief to construe all factual
allegations and inferences in a light most favorable to Jacob. Accordingly, Bezzant has
failed to meet his burden on this appeal. Jacob respectfully requests this Court to reverse
the district court's ruling and to find "process of government" does not encompass
Bezzant's publication of the Notice.
II. BEZZANT'S CONCESSION THAT JACOB'S CLAIMS HAVE MERIT UNDER
SEEGMILLER SUMMARILY DEFEATS BEZZANT'S ANTI-SLAPP
COUNTERCLAIM.
Bezzant concedes, "This Court's precedent on this issue [of whether the
statements in this case are defamatory per se] is somewhat unclear." Br. Appe. at 41.
Bezzant then minimizes this concession by referring to it as an "isolated point" that "may
make for an interesting discussion[.]" Id at 41-2. Bezzant's admission that controlling
precedent is unclear concedes the point. Jacob's claims had sufficient merit to preclude
sanctions under §78-58-105. Bezzant's characterization of this conflict in the law as an
"isolated point" is disingenuous. It was the focus of Bezzant's Motion and the basis for
the district court's finding that Jacob's defamation and false light claims lacked legal
merit. R1825:15. Thus, it was the basis for the court granting Bezzant's Motion under
the anti-SLAPP Act. Id
14

Noting this Court's seemingly contradictory opinions in Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc.,
626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981),8 and Larson v. Sysco Corp., 767 P.2d 557 (Utah 1989), the
district court incorrectly concluded Jacob's claims lacked any merit because this Court
implicitly overruled Seegmiller with its subsequent dicta in Larson that libel per se
"constitute^] allegations of criminal conduct, a loathsome disease, unchaste behavior, or
operation of an unlawful business." Rl 825:15. However, Seegmiller is still good law.
See, O'Connor v. Burningham, 2007 UT 58, ^flO, 165 P.3d 1214 9 (citing Seegmiller).
Bezzant has effectively conceded that under Seegmiller, Jacob's claims were not
wholly lacking in merit. This concession requires reversal of the district court's rulings
dismissing Jacob's complaint as a SLAPP action and awarding sanctions.
III. ACCEPTING JACOB'S FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AS TRUE AND DRAWING
ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES IN HIS FAVOR, HIS §1983 CLAIMS HAVE
MERIT AND THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES WAS IN ERROR
The district court dismissed Jacob's 42 U.S.C. §1983 claims, which were based on
the allegation Bezzant acted under the direction of AFC public officials when he
published the Notice, finding Bezzant was not acting under color of law. Id. at 21-3. The
district court found Jacob had "not met the heightened pleadings standard applied to
§1983 conspiracy claims" because his claims were "nothing more than conclusory

8

In Seegmiller, this Court explained that libel and slander per se are "distinct concepts"
and that "libel is classified as per se if it contains defamatory words specifically directed
at the person claiming injury, which words must, on their face, and without the aid of
intrinsic proof, be unmistakably recognized as injuries." Seegmiller at 977; see also
Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1975) ("to hold a person up to hatred,
contempt or ridicule, or to injure him in his business or vocation, they are deemed
actionable per se; and the law presumes that damages will be suffered therefrom").
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allegations that lack the requisite factual undergirding necessary to survive summary
judgment." R1825:22 (citing Scott v. Hem, 216 F.3d 897 (10th Cir. 2000) (when a
plaintiff alleges complicit action between private defendants and state officials, "mere
conclusory allegations with no supporting factual averments are insufficient; the
pleadings must specifically present facts tending to show agreement and concerted
action")). Jacob's pleadings meet this standard.
Discovery was automatically stayed under the Act when Bezzant filed his Motion
(R426) less than two months after Jacob's Amended Complaint was filed (which added
§1983 claims against AFC public officials), making it particularly important for the
district court to construe Jacob's factual allegations as true and to draw all reasonable
inferences in his favor. However, the district court did not do so.
Particularly, the district court found Jacob's averments that Storrs acted for his
own pecuniary benefit undermined Jacob's claim that Storrs acted in his official capacity
as an AFC councilman when he "convinced Bezzant to publish the alleged defamation."
Rl 825:22. The district court further found that because Jacob alleged AFC public
officials procured the Notice by coercive threats, Bezzant could not be implicated in the
alleged conspiracy. Rl 825:22-3. Defendants have failed to demonstrate the district
court's ruling is correct when accepting all of Jacob's factual allegations as true and
drawing all reasonable inferences in Jacob's favor.
Defendants cannot meet this burden on these facts. The district court's ruling also
did not accept Jacob's allegations as true, nor construe all reasonable inferences in
Jacob's favor. Rather, the district court speculated about genuinely disputed material
16

facts under a summary judgment standard. Had the district court correctly accepted
Jacob's allegations as true, Jacob's §1983 claims would have survived Bezzant's Motion.
Jacob extensively and in great detail alleged AFC public officials used private
entities and individuals to abridge fundamental rights of AFC citizens, including Jacob,
and public officials employed a "code of silence" to shield them from detection. R280:6;
see also id at 13-18; see R280 generally. Jacob further alleged private individuals acting
on behalf of AFC public officials were acting under color of state law, and his
fundamental rights were violated through AFC's "use of the nongovernmental defendants
Bezzant and Newtah" {id at 7-9). He also duly alleged both Hunter and Storrs were AFC
public officials at all times relevant to his claims. Id. at 36.
Jacob alleged AFC public officials, including Hunter and Storrs, abridged private
citizens' fundamental rights in various ways including unlawful meetings with a private
developer that were closed to the public, and this abuse was manifest as an ongoing
pattern and policy as early as 1992. Id. at 12, 14, 17. Jacob quickly became a target in
June 1997 during a City Council meeting when he attempted to question the City's
closed-meeting decision to build a new City Hall Complex contrary to a prior publicly
approved plan. Id. at 19. In July 1997, public official Storrs held a news conference with
Defendant Newtah and falsely accused Jacob of "grilling" AFC Council members
without factual basis. Id. at 21. Jacob was also attacked in a Newtah letter to the editor
authored by an unknown "H Stillman" and publicly criticized by Hunter who was serving
as an appointee to the City Board of Adjustments. Id. at 24, 35-6. To borrow a term
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from Defendants, the list of AFC public officials' documented abuses against Jacob and
other private citizens continues ad nauseum. See R280, generally; Br. Appe. at 19.
It must be accepted as true that AFC public officials engaged in an ongoing
practice of threats, intimidation, and retaliation against private citizens who legitimately
questioned the legality of their activities. R280:19-25, 28. AFC public officials and
those acting under their direction perpetuated a climate of fear and retaliation, and many
AFC citizens, including Jacob and his wife, were harmed and feared for their safety; and
it was the common practice of AFC public officials and their friends to violate the law
when it suited their public and private ambitions. R280:20-9, 30-1, 33-7. Further, it is
true and may be reasonably inferred that public officials engaged Bezzant and the Citizen
as instruments in their ongoing retaliatory conduct against Jacob and other private
citizens. R280:24-5, 27, 35.9 It is also true that Hunter and Storrs and other AFC public
officials threatened and colluded with Bezzant in drafting and publishing the alleged
defamatory Notice in an extraordinary effort to "blacken ... [Jacob's name] all over the
state" (quoting Mayor Ted Barratt). R280:39-41.

When an employee of the Citizen published an editorial entitled "A City In Fear," which
discussed AFC public officials' use of AFC police to retaliate against private citizens,
AFC public officials sent him a threatening message. R280:28-9; R1459. The public
perception of the AFC police and their abuse was so terrible, it was the hot topic in the
November 1997 AFC municipal election when Ted Barratt was elected as mayor only
after promising an independent investigation of the police department. R280:29-30.
When Jacob later requested documents relating to the promised investigation (which
never was conducted), Mayor Barratt threatened Jacob and his family with having
someone break into one of their homes and planting illegal contraband. R280:30-3.
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Not only did Jacob allege in detail that Defendants acted on behalf and under the
direction of AFC public officials Hunter and Storrs in publishing the Notice, but Bezzant
himself admitted his agreement and willing complicity in that publication. R280:39;
R1457 (Br. Appt. Addendum G). Construing these facts as true and drawing all
reasonable inferences in Jacob's favor, he presented detailed facts tending to show
agreement and concerted action between Bezzant and AFC public officials.
Bezzant's failure to demonstrate how the district court's ruling is correct when
construing these facts in Bezzant's favor is fatal to Bezzant's arguments on this appeal.
Accordingly, Jacob's §1983 claims were sufficiently pled and the district court's award
of attorneys fees and costs under §1988 was in error and an abuse of discretion.
IV. BEZZANT MISSTATES BOTH THE LAW AND THE FACTS IN ARGUING
JACOB'S CLAIMS FOR DEFAMATION AND FALSE LIGHT WERE
PROPERLY DISMISSED
Bezzant cites Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) as supporting authority for his
argument that his unnecessary and malicious statements about Jacob were protected
because they were carefully imbedded within the context of purported political speech.
The facts of that case are inapposite. Buckley was about the propriety of placing caps on
campaign contributions. The Court stated, "A limitation on the amount of money a
person may give to a candidate or campaign organization [] involves little direct restraint
on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support
evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to
discuss candidates and issues." Id. at 21 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court never
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suggested alleged defamatory statements about private citizens strategically placed within
the context of purported political speech should be immune from prosecution.
Bezzant's statements about Jacob were not about either a candidate or a public
issue. They were about a private citizen who wished to remain anonymous and had
nothing to do with the correct interpretation of the City Ordinances. Bezzant never
addresses the fact that it is not political speech that is at issue in this case. It is the
alleged defamatory statements about a private individual that were completely
unnecessary to the political issue Bezzant now seeks to hide behind.10
A.

Utah's public interest privilege does not immunize Bezzant from liability
for deliberately harming Jacob's reputation.

Jacob has never disputed that matters of public interest should be open for public
debate. Jacob has only maintained that identifying him contrary to long-standing
agreement and then publicly accusing him of lying and negative campaigning was
unnecessary, malicious, and deliberately designed to hold him out as an object of public
ridicule. In other words, Jacob is not "a matter of public interest."
Bezzant does not spend a lot of time on this argument and for good reason.
Bezzant concedes matters of public interest are limited to statements about "the
functioning of governmental bodies, officials, or public institutions, or with respect to

10

Without citing to the record, Bezzant argues in a footnote that the district court granted
his motion to dismiss both under the anti-SLAPP Act and for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted under Rule 12(c). Br. Appe. 34-5, fh. 8. However, the
district court only discussed the Act and the alternative bases for dismissing Jacob's
claims, with no mention of Rule 12(c). R1825. Moreover, Jacob's meritorious claims
would not be dismissed under that rule.
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matters involving the expenditure of public funds." Br. Appe. at 37 (citing Seegmiller).
Bezzant's statements about Jacob, a private citizen, clearly do not fit within that
limitation. If a private citizen is falsely accused of being a rapist or a liar within the
context of a public debate about the correct interpretation of municipal ordinances, the
public interest privilege was never intended to shield the defamer from liability. A
malicious defamer cannot hide behind the First Amendment or the privileges created
under it by couching hate-driven defamatory speech within a purported public issue.
The district court concluded Utah's public interest privilege applied because the
Notice was not excessively published and was not published with malice.11 Given the
extraordinary measures Bezzant took to publish the Notice worldwide and the facts
showing Bezzant's statements about Jacob were false and malicious, both in the sense
they were mean-spirited and knowing, intentional and reckless, the district court's ruling
is in error. Jacob made this argument in his opening brief. Br. Appt. 39-40.
Bezzant conclusorily asserts Jacob has not sufficiently alleged malice then only
briefly acknowledges those facts establishing malice (see e.g., Br. Appt. at 10-12, 18)
when he argues his intent is immaterial. Br. Appe. 44-5. It must be accepted as true that
the false statements in the Notice were not the result of Bezzant's careful research about
Hunter's and Storrs' conflicts of interest; they were knowingly, intentionally, and
recklessly published under the direction of Hunter and Storrs. Id. But even without
accepting these allegations as true, the public interest privilege does not apply as a matter
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of law because Bezzant's statements about Jacob were not an issue of public concern.
Accordingly, the district court's ruling should be reversed.
B.

The Notice is not an editorial and the statements therein are verifiable.

This section of Bezzant's brief is also short for a reason. The legal question of
whether the City Ordinances at issue disqualified Hunter and Storrs from the election is
certainly verifiable, as are the statements that Jacob deliberately misled the public to hurt
the candidates and to engage in negative campaigning. Moreover, Jacob has maintained
both below and throughout this appeal that the Notice was never an editorial and was
only characterized as such in Bezzant's attempt to fit unfavorable facts within favorable
law. Br. Appt. 41-2. Therefore, the district court's ruling should be reversed.
C.

The context of the malicious statements makes them defamatory, and they
are defamatory per se because they accuse Jacob of lying and were
designed to hold him out as an object of public contempt and ridicule.

Whether Bezzant's statements about Jacob convey a defamatory meaning depends
upon the context in which they were made. O 'Connor v. Burningham, supra. "Context"
is defined as "the whole situation, background, or environment relevant to a particular
event" (WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, Second College Edition (1980) at 307).
The whole situation, background, and environment relevant to Bezzant's
publication of the Notice was one of corrupt municipal public officials utilizing the local
police force, news media, and other improper means to threaten and intimidate private
citizens including Jacob. It was an environment where public officials hid their activities
11

See district court's analysis at R1825:16 (citing Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc.,
842 P.2d 896, 904-05 (Utah 1992)) where the court finds the privilege protected
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from their constituents and supported candidates who were ineligible for public office
under pertinent municipal ordinances, and who publicly and privately attacked any
private citizen who raised questions about these activities. Further, Bezzant's Notice was
published not to engage in protected First Amendment activity, but as a sham to further
his own interests, which Bezzant admits. R 1457 (Br. Appt, Addendum D).
Given this context of municipal corruption, abuse, and power mongering,
Bezzant's self-serving and malicious statements about Jacob were and are defamatory.
If Bezzant's true purpose were simply to engage in political speech, he would not have
violated his long-standing agreement and disclosed Jacob's name. That disclosure was
unnecessary to any alleged political debate but was a purposeful, malicious act calculated
to harass and hurt Jacob. The accompanying false allegations that Jacob was a liar and
negative campaigner were purposefully included to hold him out as an object of public
hatred, contempt, and ridicule. Accordingly, the self-serving and abusive context
surrounding Bezzant's statements makes them defamatory as a matter of law.
V. BEZZANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE HE IS ENTITLED TO
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS UNDER THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE
The parties' dispute on this issue centers on whether §78-58-105(l)(a) allows an
award of attorneys fees not for bad faith or for filing claims wholly lacking in merit, but
for not succeeding on the merits. Bezzant earnestly contends the statute requires no

Bezzant's statements because they were not excessively published or with malice.
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showing of bad faith (Br. Appe. at 44-5), which is inconsistent with his former position,
but is consistent with his tendency to construe the most unfavorable facts and law in his
favor. Thus, Bezzant argues, affidavits from Jacob's attorneys explaining how they
assessed the merits of Jacob's claims in good faith are not relevant. Br. Appe. at 45.
This is actually a compelling concession on Bezzant's part. He does not even
argue Jacob filed his complaint in bad faith. Nor can he. Rather, Bezzant effectively
concedes that when Jacob filed his complaint for the alleged primary purpose of chilling
Bezzant's proper participation in the process of government, this Court can assume he did
so in good faith. Id. This concession makes no sense, particularly given the nearly
$200,000 that Jacob has been sanctioned for filing his complaint in the first place.
At a minimum, it is bad policy to severely sanction a party not for bad faith, which
Bezzant concedes is not a factor here, but for not accurately predicting the outcome of a
good faith dispute. Bezzant asks this Court to conclude that a lack of success on the
merits, not bad faith, is evidence of a primary purpose to interfere with or chill a
defendant's right to participate in government processes. Bezzant cannot have it both
ways. He cannot argue Jacob's motive in filing his complaint was both improper and in
good faith. Regardless of whether Plaintiffs or Defendants ultimately prevail on the
merits, Jacob has demonstrated from the beginning that his claims have at least some
merit and are not so wholly lacking in merit that sanctions are appropriate. Accordingly,
the district court's award of attorneys fees was improper and should be reversed.
12

See, R3069:90 (Bezzant's counsel argued, "When you get attorney's fees is under that
105 portion of the statute which require you to prove additional elements, essentially bad
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VI. BEZZANT MISCONSTRUES JACOB'S ARGUMENT UNDER THE OPEN
COURTS CLAUSE AND THUS FAILS TO REBUT IT
Bezzant appears to misunderstand Jacob's argument under the Open Courts
clause. Jacob did not ask this Court to strike the anti-SLAPP Act as unconstitutional.
Rather, he argued the Act was unconstitutional because it violates Utah's Open Courts
clause as applied to these facts. Br. Appt. at 43-7 (arguing the Act is unconstitutional as
applied because it abrogates Jacob's remedy for harm to his reputation and because the
evil the Act was designed to eliminate does not exist here). Therefore, Bezzant has failed
to rebut Jacob's as-applied arguments, which thus continue to stand on their own merits.
CONCLUSION
Defendants have failed to meet their burden on this appeal. Plaintiffs respectfully
request this Court to reverse the trial court's ruling and to remand this matter for trial.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of October, 2007.
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC
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faith and no legal good faith basis for bringing the claim.").
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LEXSTAT R.I. GEN. LAWS 9-33-1
General Laws of Rhode Island
Copyright; 1953-2006 by the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations and Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
*** Current through the January 2006 Session ***
*** Annotations current through November 14, 2006 ***
TITLE 9. COURTS AND CIVIL PROCEDURE-PROCEDURE GENERALLY
CHAPTER 33. LIMITS ON STRATEGIC LITIGATION AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Go to the Rhode Island Code Archive Directory
R.I. Gen. Laws §9-33-1 (2007)
§9-33-1. Findings

The legislature finds and declares that full participation by persons and organizations and robust discussion of issues
of public concern before the legislative, judicial, and administrative bodies and in other public fora are essential to the
democratic process, that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of
the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances; that such litigation is disfavored
and should be resolved quickly with minimum cost to citizens who have participated in matters of public concern.
HISTORY: P.L. 1993, ch. 354, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 448, § 1.
NOTES:
LAW REVIEWS. 2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 593 (2001).
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Analysis
1. Constitutionality.
2. Freedom of Speech.
1. CONSTITUTIONALITY.
This chapter is constitutional. Hometown Properties, Inc. v. Fleming, 680 A.2d 56 (R.L 1996).
2. FREEDOM OF SPEECH.
Since a citizen's letters to the editor of a newspaper voicing his opinion on a public school construction project were
exercises of free speech, summary judgment in favor of the citizen was appropriate as to the Limits on Strategic
Litigation Against Public Participation Act (anti-SLAPP statute), R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-1 et seq. defense to the political
representative's libel and false light suit. Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 163 (R.L
2004).
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LEXSTAT R.I. GEN. LAWS 9-33-2
General Laws of Rhode Island
Copyright; 1953-2006 by the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations and Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
*** Current through the January 2006 Session ***
*** Annotations current through November 14, 2006 ***
TITLE 9. COURTS AND CIVIL PROCEDURE-PROCEDURE GENERALLY
CHAPTER 33. LIMITS ON STRATEGIC LITIGATION AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Go to the Rhode Island Code Archive Directory
R.L Gen. Laws § 9-33-2 (2007)
§ 9-33-2. Conditional immunity

(a) A party's exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech under the United States or Rhode Island
constitutions in connection with a matter of public concern shall be conditionally immune from civil claims,
counterclaims, or cross-claims. Such immunity will apply as a bar to any civil claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim
directed at petition or free speech as defined in subsection (e) of this section, except if the petition or free speech
constitutes a sham. The petition or free speech constitutes a sham only if it is not genuinely aimed at procuring
favorable government action, result, or outcome, regardless of ultimate motive or purpose. The petition or free speech
will be deemed to constitute a sham as defined in the previous sentence only if it is both:
(1) Objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable person exercising the right of speech or petition could
realistically expect success in procuring the government action, result, or outcome, and
(2) Subjectively baseless in the sense that it is actually an attempt to use the governmental process itself for its
own direct effects. Use of outcome or result of the governmental process shall not constitute use of the governmental
process itself for its own direct effects.
(b) The court shall stay all discovery proceedings in the action upon the filing of a motion asserting the immunity
established by this section; provided, however, that the court, on motion and after a hearing and for good cause shown,
may order that specified discovery be conducted. The stay of discovery shall remain in effect until notice of entry of the
order ruling on the motion.
(c) The immunity established by this section may be asserted by an appropriate motion or by other appropriate
means under the applicable rules of civil procedure.
(d) If the court grants the motion asserting the immunity established by this section, or if the party claiming lawful
exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech under the United States or Rhode Island constitutions in
connection with a matter of public concern is, in fact, the eventual prevailing party at trial, the court shall award the
prevailing party costs and reasonable attorney's fees, including those incurred for the motion and any related discovery
matters. The court shall award compensatory damages and may award punitive damages upon a showing by the
prevailing party that the responding party's claims, counterclaims, or cross-claims were frivolous or were brought with
an intent to harass the party or otherwise inhibit the party's exercise of its right to petition or free speech under the
United States or Rhode Island constitution. Nothing in this section shall affect or preclude the right of the party claiming
lawful exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech under the United States or Rhode Island constitutions to
any remedy otherwise authorized by law.
(e) As used in this section, "a party's exercise of its right of petition or of free speech" shall mean any written or
oral statement made before or submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental
proceeding; any written or oral statement made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
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legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; or any written or oral statement made in
connection with an issue of public concern.
HISTORY: P.L. 1993, ch. 354, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 448, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 386, § 1.
NOTES:
LAW REVIEWS. 2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 593 (2001).
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Analysis
1. Assertion of Immunity.
2. Sham Petitions.
3. Right of Petition.
4. Zoning Appeals.
1. ASSERTION OF IMMUNITY.
The "appropriate motion" or "or other appropriate means" described in the 1995 amendment of subsection (c) is a
motion for summary judgment that will allow the hearing justice to consider information extrinsic to the pleadings.
Hometown Properties, Inc. v. Fleming, 680 A.2d 56 (R.I. 1996).
Since a citizen's letters to the editor of a newspaper voicing his opinion on a public school construction project were
exercises of free speech, summary judgment in favor of the citizen was appropriate as to the Limits on Strategic
Litigation Against Public Participation Act (anti-SLAPP statute), R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-1 et seq. defense to the political
representative's libel and false light suit. Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 163 (R.I.
2004).
2. SHAM PETITIONS.
The legislature intended the 1995 amendment to clarify and not to cloud the material provisions of this section, and
intended that the term "tortious conduct" in the 1993 act be synonymous with the term "sham petitioning" in the 1995
amendment. Hometown Properties, Inc. v. Fleming, 680 A.2d56 (R.I. 1996).
3. RIGHT OF PETITION.
In a suit by the owners of a city landfill against a city resident alleging tortious interference with contractual relations
and defamation, the defendant's written statements, submitted to an executive body as well as to legislators, were made
in connection with an issue under consideration by the Department of Environmental Management and in connection
with an issue of public concern, namely potential environmental contamination resulting from the plaintiffs activities,
and therefore clearly constituted an exercise of her right of petition and free speech within the meaning of subsection
(e). Hometown Properties, Inc. v. Fleming, 680 A.2d 56 (R.I. 1996).
4. ZONING APPEALS.
Since the plaintiff presented insufficient facts and allegations to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the
defendant had probable cause to appeal a zoning amendment to the Superior Court, and, at trial, the defendant presented
expert and lay testimony in support of its position, the defendant's appeal of the zoning decision was not objectively
baseless, and the appeal was not a "sham" that would bar the conditional immunity provided by this section. Cove Rd.
Dev. v. Western Cranston Indus. ParkAssocs., 674 A.2d 1234 (R.I. 1996).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES. Application of Noerr-Pennington Doctrine by state courts. 94 A.L.R.5th 455.
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No. 98-597-AppeaI.
SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND
1208; 2000 HI LEXIS 224

December 14, 2000, Decided
December 14, 2000, Opinion Filed
PRIOR HISTORY:
[" M] Appeal !r ;
Court. Kent County. Hurst, J. (KC-97-710).
DISPOSITION:
"W e deny and
appeal, affirm the summary judgment
Mallettes, and the award of counsel fees
for the Mallettes for services rendered
Court.

* iperioi

dismiss Global's
in favor of the
made to counsel
in the Superior

MIDGES: Weisberger, C.J., Lederberg, Bourcier, and
Goldberg, JJ., concurring. Flanders J., did not attend oral
arguments, but participated on the basis of the briefs.

OPINION
[* 1208] OPINION
Bourcier, Justice. In this case Global Waste
Recycling, Inc. (Global), the plaintiff below, appeals
from the entry of summary judgment in favor of the
defendant on its Superior Court civil action in which
Global had sought both "economic damages" as well as
punitive damages from the defendants, Henry and
Marcia Mallette.
On appeal, Global contends that the trial justice
erred in granting summary judgment after finding that its
civil action was barred by virtue of the provisions of
G.L. 1956 chapter 33 of title 9, the Strategic Litigation
Against Public Participation statute (the anti-SLAPP
statute). We reject Global's contention and affirm the
grant of summary judgment.
[*1209] I
Case Facts/Travel
Since June 30, 1995, Global [**2]
has been,
operating an unlicensed construction and demolition

debris recycling facility located in an area that is zoned
for residential use on Colvintown Road in the Town of
Coventry. Global has been permitted to operate its debris
recycling facility there pursuant to a consent judgment
and operation plan entered on June 30, 1995, between the
state Department of Environmental Management (DEM),
Bettez Recycling, Inc., Bettez Construction Company,
Inc., (Bettez), and Global. Some background information
concerning the property site in question is helpful.
From 1981 until 1989, Tri County Sand and Gravel,
Ii ic, had operated a construction and demolition debris
recycling facility on the land. During that time it had
permitted large stockpiles of unsold debris and materials
to accumulate on the site. In March 1990, Bettez began
operating an unlicensed landfill on the property.
Following complaints and on-site inspections, the DEM,
Division of Air and Hazardous Materials, issued notices
of violation. Following DEM hearings on the violation
notices, Bettez was ordered by a final DEM agency
decision, entered on March 5, 1991, to "cease receiving
materials, dispose of the materials on site [**3] and pay
an administrative remedy to the DEM." Bettez filed an
administrative appeal from that DEM final decision in
the Kent County Superior Court.
While that administrative appeal was pending,
Global became interested in operating a construction and
demolition debris recycling facility on the Bettez
property site and moved to intervene in Bettez's pending
appeal. Once in the case, Global then undertook to
negotiate a settlement with DEM. On June 30, 1995, a
negotiated settlement was reached. The settlement was
evidenced by a consent judgment that included an
operating plan in which Global would be permitted to
operate a construction and demolition debris recycling
facility on the Bettez site. The operating plan that was
spelled out in the consent judgment contained several
conditions that Global was required to comply with and
perform. The operation plan, however, did not constitute

Page 2
762 A.2d 1208, *; 2000 R.I. LEXIS 224, **

a DEM license for the operation; instead, it was in the
nature of a conditional permit that required, among other
obligations, for Global to immediately process 75
percent of the six then-existing on-site stockpiles of
demolition materials left there by Bettez. In addition,
Global was required to furnish [**4] DEM with a
closure fund and to comply with all applicable state,
federal and local requirements, including any new
regulations for licensing and regulation of recycling and
solid waste management facilities.
On December 16, 1996, Global was notified by the
DEM Office of Waste Management that violations of
Global's Waste Recycling Operation Plan were observed
following a site inspection by DEM officials on
December 12, 1996. One of those alleged violations
concerned
"substantial quantities of processed
construction and demolition material" being left on the
site. Those expanding construction and demolition
material stockpiles had also been observed by many of
the local residents living in the area, including Henry
Mallette, Jr. and his wife, Marcia Mallette, whose
residence unfortunately adjoins the Global site. As the
Global stockpiles expanded, so did the Mallette's concern
over the possibility of contamination of their well water,
of airborne pollutants from composted materials left on
the site, and the fire hazard created by the stockpiled
demolition debris. The Mallettes, joined by some fortytwo other similarly alarmed Colvintown Road residents,
filed a petition with the Coventry [**5] Town Council
seeking relief from Global's expansion of those
conditions at its facility. That petition was presented to
the town council in mid July, 1997. The Mallettes,
however, were not present at the council meeting.
[*1210] As was feared and anticipated by the
Colvintown Road residents, including the Mallettes, on
July 30, 1997, a fire did break out on Global's site.
Counsel for Global, in attempting to minimize the
significance of that incident, has described that fire as
being "a small fire *** that was extinguished in less than
one hour." That description is certainly at great odds with
that recounted by the Coventry fire chief and the
Coventry police, who were at the scene, and who
described the fire as breaking out "shortly after 5 p.m."
and throwing heavy "dark blackish-blue smoke" over the
area and prompting the necessity of "fire trucks from
Washington, Western Coventry, Chopmist Hill,
Potterville, West Greenwich, Scituate, Hope Jackson,
Mishnock, West Greenwich [sic], Nooseneck Hill,
Hianloland and North Smithfield fire departments." The
Coventry fire chief informed the local press that
firefighters "had to break [the pile of wood] up with
bulldozers" and were required [**6] to douse the pile
with water and "class A foam." The firefighters were
unable to control and extinguish the fire until 7:30 p.m.

During the ongoing fire, a news reporter from the
local Kent County Daily Times newspaper spoke with
and interviewed several of the many local residents at the
fire scene. One of those persons interviewed was Henry
Mallette, Jr., one of the two defendants in this case.
Mallette is reported to have said, "who knows what
they're burning over there. They say its mulch, but I
know what it is. It's lead and asbestos and every other
thing." l Some eight days later, while the newspaper was
doing follow-up stories on Global's operation and the
ongoing neighborhood concern over Global's operation
of its yet unlicensed construction and demolition debris
recycling facility, one of its reporters spoke with Marcia
Mallette, Henry's wife, and codefendant. She told the
reporter that "old homes are taken in there and piled up,
they just sit there. I don't think any recycling is going
on." 2 Her comment, along with that of others, was
reported in the Kent County Daily Times on August 9,
1997.
1
Mallette, in an affidavit, says he was
misquoted. He states that he told the reporter
"God knows what's burning. There's lead and
asbestos and who knows what else in those
piles."
[**7]
2
On January 31, 1997, the Mallettes had
received a copy of DEM's letter to Global
advising Global that among other noted site
inspection deficiencies, that its DEM
"inspector noted that substantial
quantities
of
processed
construction
and
demolition
material is not leaving the site.
Please be advised that if this
material is not reused then this
office regards the material as
discarded in a manner as to
constitute the unpermitted disposal
of solid waste. Please provide this
Office with documentation which
indicates that the material is being
recycled."

Three days later, on August 12, 1997, Global
initiated a civil action for defamation against the
Mallettes, claiming that its construction and demolition
recycling business and reputation had been destroyed by
the publication of the Mallettes' statements in the Kent
County Daily Times. Global sought both "economic
damages" as well as punitive damages from the
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Mallettes, Four months later, on December 8, 1997, a
Superior Court hearing justice granted summary
judgment in favor of the Mallettes after finding that
Global's action [**8] constituted an attempt by Global to
silence legitimate statements on a matter of public
concern. An interlocutory order reflecting that finding
was entered on January 12, 1998 Thereafter, on April
23, 1998, following a hearing on the Mallettes' request
for counsel fees, an order awarding counsel fees against
Global was entered and final judgment in the case
entered on that same day. Global's appeal followed on
May 5, 1998.
II
The Anti-SLAPP Statute
In Hometown Properties, Inc. v. F leming, 680 A. 2d
56 (R I 1996), this Court had [*1211] occasion to
construe for the first time the provisions of chapter 33 of
title 9, as enacted by P.L. 1993, ch. 354, being entitled
"Limits on Strategic Litigation Against Public
Participation" (the anti-SLAPP statute or the act).
In Hometown we determined the act to be
constitutional, and intended to emulate the federal NoerrPennington doctrine 3 by providing conditional immunity
to any person exercising his or her right of petition or
free speech under the United States or Rhode Island
Constitution concerning matters of public concern. That
conditional immunity, we held, would render the
petitioner or speaker immune from any civil claims [**9]
for statements, or petitions, that were not sham by virtue
of being objectively or subjectively baseless. Section 933-2(a) of the anti-SLAPP statute defines a sham
statement or petition as being one that is:
"(I) Objectively baseless in the sense
that no reasonable person exercising the
right of speech or petition could
realistically expect success in procuring
the government action, result, or outcome,
and
"(2) Subjectively baseless in the
sense that it is actually an attempt to use
the governmental process itself for its
own direct effects. Use of outcome or
result of the governmental process shall
not constitute use of the governmental
process itself for its own direct effects."

3
United Mine Workers oj America v.
Pennington 381 U.S. 657, 85 S. Ct. 1585, 14 L
Ed, 2d 626 (1965); Eastern Railroad Presidents

Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. 365 U.S.
127, 81 S. Ct. 523, 5 L. Ed 2d 464 (1961). See
also Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v.
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 US, 49,
113S Ct. 1920, 123 L. Ed 2d 611 (1993).
[**10] 1 he Mallettes, in their answer to Global's
complaint, raised the issue of their conditional immunity
provided by § 9-33-2. They subsequently and properly
moved for entry of summary judgment pursuant to Rule
56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure
The Superior Court motion hearing justice, after
considering the Mallettes' motion for summary judgment,
and after viewing the case pleadings and affidavits in the
light most favorable to Global and against the Mallettes
(see LaFratta v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority,
751 A.2d 1281, 1283 (R.I 2000)), found that the
Mallettes' statements were neither objectively sham nor
actionable in light of the immunity protection afforded
those statements by virtue of § 9-33-2. The hearing
ritict riot' -1
"In the instant case, the Mallettes made
comments or remarks about an issue
which was clearly one of public concern.
Not only is the operation of a 94 acre
recycling plant on its face a matter of
concern, the issue of this recycling was
and had been a matter of public concern.
It had been the subject of D.E.M.
proceedings as well as a petition
presented to the local Town Council
Pollution and environmental [**11]
contamination is a matter of concern to
the public as well as to the residents of the
communities in which the recycling plant
and landfill are operated. This is
unquestionable.
"The Mallettes' remarks were typical
of those frequently made by citizens,
taxpayers, neighbors or other residents of
the community who wish to spark or spur
governmental action or to otherwise
obtain a satisfactory resolution of their
concerns. Making loud and public
complaints to newspaper reporters is a
frequently used method for members of a
community to affect local matters of
interest or concern. Members of the public
and residents of neighborhoods often use
the news media as a forum for
communicating
their
concerns
to
whatever governmental authorities may
have an interest in or power over the
matter at hand. This method is frequently
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successful in achieving a response from
local town administrators to governors, to
legislators to presidents. Concerning the
American experience, it's undoubtedly
[*1212] realistic to expect some success
in securing a governmental response when
this method is utilized.
"Considering the undisputed facts
material to the issues raised by the
motion, the criteria for objective
baselessness [**12] is not met. The
remarks are not objectively baseless in the
sense that no reasonable person exercising
the right of free speech could realistically
expect some success. Given that the
remarks were also based on the Mallettes'
personal observations as well as the
history of information gleaned from the
D.E.M., any expectation that favorable
governmental action or outcome to be had
here could not be deemed to be
unreasonable.
"The motion for summary judgment
is granted. The Mallettes are entitled to
conditional immunity. The remarks were
not objectively baseless."

Ill
Global's Appellate Contentions
On appeal, Global challenges the propriety of the
motion hearing justice's grant of summary judgment in
favor of the Mallettes. Global asserts here that (a) the
policy of the anti-SLAPP statute was not intended to bar
claims for tortious actions brought by a litigant who has
"suffered actual economic injuries from baseless attacks
upon [its] business reputation;" (b) the statements by the
Mallettes were not made at a "judicial, administrative or
legislative proceeding;" and (c) that the term "issues of
public concern as contained in the anti-SLAPP statute is
void as being unconstitutionally [** 13] vague."
This Court, when reviewing the grant of a motion
for summary judgment does so on a de novo basis. See
Macera Brothers of Cranston, Inc. v. Gelfuso & Lachut,
Inc., 740 A.2d 1262, 1264 (HL 1999) (per curiam). In the
case at bar, we have reviewed the case pleadings and
affidavits submitted by the Mallettes as well as other
case file materials and have done so in a light most
favorable to Global to determine if the Mallettes were
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See
Truk-Away of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 723 A.2d 309, 313 (R.I. 1999). Following

that review, we are convinced that the hearing justice did
not err and that summary judgment in favor of the
Mallettes was appropriate. We conclude that Global's
appellate issues, cleverly fashioned to misstate both
material facts as well as the provisions of § 9-33-2(a),
are without merit.4
4
Global's contention was prefaced by its
alerting us that "this Court should be aware that
at no time prior to the statements being made [by
the Mallettes] was Global going through any
form of permitting or licensing process * * * with
any state * * * agency." (Emphasis added.) That
contention is factually erroneous. A letter dated
July 7, 1997, to Global from Leo Hellested, DEM
Supervising Engineer,
Office
of Waste
Management, a copy of which is contained in the
Mallettes' affidavit, sets out clearly that as a result
of earlier site inspections of Global's facility by
DEM, it was "noted that a substantial quantity of
processed construction and demolition material
continues to be stockpiled on the site."
Additionally, DEM, in its letter, noted:
"Also please be reminded, as we
discussed
during
the
May
inspection, that the Department is
still awaiting a revised license
application submittal that more
completely addresses all of the
requirements of the revised Rules
and Regulations for Composting
Facilities
and
Solid
Waste
Management Facilities, January,
1997." (Emphasis added and in the
original.)

Earlier, on December 16, 1996, DEM had
notified Global of its "substantial quantities of
processed construction and demolition material"
that were not being removed from Global's
facility and which could be regarded as
"unpermitted disposal of solid waste." Judith
Sine, a DEM engineer, also noted that Global
recently had acquired a "new shredder and
screen" and that pursuant to the June 30, 1995
consent judgment (section 5-C), under which
Global was permitted to operate its facility,
Global was required to submit any proposed
expansion of its site equipment to DEM for
approval, and for amendment to the Operation
Plan provided for in the consent judgment. Thus,
contrary to what Global has asserted to us, both
in its appellate brief and at oral argument, there
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was indeed both ongoing Global licensing and
permit proceedings at the time the Mallettes'
statements were made.
[**14]

•*';.[.>!

-

i.t:r;«, .i, ib initial and rather rhetorically phrased
4 c lug appellate contention, asserts that the legislative
policy embodied within our anti-SLAPP statute never
was intended to bar civil actions brought by a litigant
who has "suffered actual economic injuries from baseless
attacks upon [its] business reputation." That contention
would have merit if the facts in this case were such as to
warrant any inference that the statements made by the
Mallettes and concerning Global's operation of its
construction and demolition debris recycling business
were "baseless" or sham statements when made.
However, that is not the case here.
The motion hearing justice specifically found that
the statements made by the Mallettes were not
objectively baseless and thus, not sham and, as a result,
Global's suit was barred pursuant to the express
immunity provisions of § 9-33-2(a). Because our de
novo review of the case filings and affidavits leads us to
that same conclusion, we reject Global's initial appellate
assertion of error as being meritless.
(1 *)
As to Global's next contention that "the invocation
of the immunity provided by the anti-SLAPP statute"
requires that the statement or [**15] statements for
which immunity is claimed, "must be made before some
type of legislative, judicial or administrative body" and
"not to the public via the print media," such contention is
both novel and meritless.
W e noted in Hometown Properties, Inc., that the
Legislature's clear intention for enacting the anti-SLAPP
statute in 1993 was to allow the "full participation by
persons and organizations and robust discussion of issues
of public concern before the legislative, judicial, and
administrative bodies, and in other public fora." 680 A.2d
at 61 (quoting § 9-33-1). (Emphasis added.) Section 933-1 of the anti-SLAPP statute makes clear the
Legislature's disfavor of lawsuits brought primarily to
"chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of
freedom of speech" by persons making public statements
in connection with an issue of public concern. Section 9~
33-1 not only encourages but also to protects "robust
discussion of issues of public concern" in the "public
fora." In 1995, the Legislature specifically amended § 933-2 to provide explicit immunity to persons and
organizations making statements not objectively or
subjectively baseless in the [**16] course of robust
discussion of public concern. P.I 1995, ch. 386, § 1.

In this case, we are satisfied that the hearing justice
carefully reviewed and considered whether the
statements made by the Mallettes were objectively
baseless. She found that they were not, and that the
immunity from suit provided by the anti-SLAPP statute
protected the Mallettes from Global's alleged defamation
claims. We also have reviewed the hearing record and
case filings and likewise conclude that the statements by
the Mallettes were not objectively baseless and were thus
entitled to immunity from civil suit as provided for in §
9-33-2(a). Indeed, we additionally observe that the
facility, as found to be conducted by Global, whether
licensed, permitted, or in operation before the Mallettes
and their neighbors moved to Colvintown Road, actually
might constitute an actionable private nuisance to the
Mallettes and their neighbors.5 See, e.g., Weida v. Ferry,
493 A.2d824, 826-27 (R.I. 1985).
5 The stockpiles, without an adequate closurefund as required by DEM, apparently still remain
on Global's site. See Reitsma v. Global Waste
Recycling, Inc., C.A. KC-57.
[**17] (C)
Global's final appellate c o n t e n tion is that the term
"issues of public concern" contained in § 9-33-2(a) is
"overly broad, ambiguous and without a definable,
concrete meaning" and thus "in violation of the due
process clauses of both the Rhode [*1214] Island and
\ Jnited States Constitution" requires but scant
consideration
We respond to that constitutional challenge in two
ways. First, the term "issues of public concern" is not so
"overly broad, ambiguous and without a definable,
concrete meaning," as contended by Global, excepting
perhaps only to Global. That phrase and wording, we
point out, enjoys a long, distinguished and unchallenged
career in both state and civil defamation actions as well
in tortious conduct actions, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. §
1983. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.
Ct. 1684, 75 L. Ed 2d 708 (1983); Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 91 S. Ct. 181 1, 29 L Ed
2d 296 (1971); Pickering v. Board of Education of
Township High School District 205, Will County, 391
U.S. 563, 88 S Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968); Smith
v. Fruin 28 F3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 1994); [**18]
Vukadinovich v. Bartels 853 F.2d 1387, 1390 (7th Cir.
1988); Kent v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 349 F. Supp. 622,
627 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Caron v. Silvia, 32 Mass. App. Ct.
271, 588 N.E2d 711, 714 (Mass. App.Ct. 1992); Burkes
v. Klauser, 185 Wis. 2d309, 517N.W.2d 503, 510 (Wis*
1994),
Secondly, we observe, as did the motion hearing
justice, that Global both failed and neglected to comply
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with its clear obligation when challenging the
constitutionality of a state statute to "serve the attorney
general with a copy of the proceedings within such time
to afford the attorney general an opportunity to
intervene." Super. R. Civ. P. 24(d). See also G.L. 1956 §
9-30-11. We do not believe that this Court should
undertake to determine the constitutionality of a state
statute in a given case without first affording the
Attorney General the opportunity to intervene and be
heard. See Crossman v. Erickson, 570 A. 2d 651, 654
(R.I. 1990).
For the reasons herein above set out, we deny and
dismiss Global's appeal, affirm the summary judgment in
favor of the Mallettes, and the award of counsel fees

made to counsel for the [**19] Mallettes for services
rendered in the Superior Court.
Before we remand the papers in this case to the
Superior Court, we direct counsel for the Mallettes to
furnish this Court with a detailed request for counsel fees
and any costs relating to this appeal, and direct that a
copy thereof be submitted to counsel representing
Global. This Court will, after consideration of counsel's
request and any objection filed thereto, award an
appropriate fee to Mallettes' counsel for his appellate
representation of the Mallettes.
Justice Flanders did not attend oral arguments, but
participated on the basis of the briefs.

COMPARISON OV UKZZANJ S FACTS TO THE RECORD
The following list is by no means intended to be exhaustive, but does
respond to some of Bezzant's most glaring misrepresentations of the facts
1.

Bezzant claims Jacob is a "wealthy businessman ana real estate
developer" (Br. Appe at 5), citing the district court's ruling granting
Bezzant's motion for summary judgment (Rl 825:7-9) and his own
memorandum in support of his Motion (R515:viii-xi). This claim is
false and there are no facts on the record to support it. Jacob is a
businessman but is not a real estate developer.

2.

Bezzant claims tins matter was delayed wnen Jacob opposed "his own
counsel's motion to withdraw, attempting to 'consolidate' this case with
a massive class action filed on behalf of every citizen in American Fork,
violating a stay on discovery, and eventually refusing to appear with
new counsel for nearly a year." Br. Appe. at 5 (emphasis in original;
citing the district court's ruling and Bezzant's own pleadings). These
allegations are very misleading. Jacob's former counsel, not Jacob,
fought his own firm's motion to withdraw from the case. R582, R607.
Bezzant also fails to acknowledge his own strategically complicit role in
moving to disqualify Jacob's former counsel. R582, R642. Iliis
internal dispute was really between Jacob's former counsel and his own
firm. Id. In a nutshell, Jacob's former counsel had represented him in
this matter for several months when his firm decided to seek business
from parties with interests adverse to Jacob's. R582. Further, Jacob
never violated the stay on discovery. Jacob had a court order from
federal Judge Paul Cassell allowing him to take the deposition of AFC
public official, Don Hampton, in a separate case. As a courtesy, Jacob
provided notice of that deposition in this case also because the cases
were related. Further, Bezzant's claim that this matter was delayed
because Jacob refused "to appear with new counsel for nearly a year" is
both knowingly and blatantly false; Bezzant took aggressive and
ultimately successful measures to disqualify Jacob's former counsel in a
strategic and hotly litigated tactic to deprive Jacob of counsel,
unnecessarily increase both parties' costs, and unnecessarily delay this
matter. Id. To now blame Jacob for that dispute truly lacks candor.
Bezzant falsely claims that interpretation of the AFC ordinances
underlying the dispute in this case was a debate that "came to a head in
the days before the 1999 election and has required periodic decisions
and interpretations by the City Attorney, Mayor, and City Council" (Br.
Appe. at 7, citing his own pleadings). This statement is very

misleading. The truth is interpretation of the ordinances was not a
pending issue before AFC public officials as they had already decided to
ignore any conflicts of interests created by Tom Hunter's and Ricky
Storrs' candidacies. R516, Tab H (Deposition of Ricky Storrs), at 100,
112 (Storrs, who was an AFC councilman since 1991, testified he did
not remember the conflict of interest issue ever coming up in AFC
council meetings); at 129 (Storrs testified that Bezzant called and told
him about the Notice, then Storrs received a copy like every other AFC
citizen; he had no other discussions with anyone about the subject); at
130 (Storrs testified, "I seen it [the Notice] when [it] went around the
door steps as a flyer."); at 152 (Storrs reiterated he had no other
discussions with anyone about the Notice); R516, Tab E at 141 (Ted
Barratt testified there were no discussions about the Notice).
On pages 14 and 15 of Bezzant's brief, he cites R1285:5, R1969:l 1, and
R2463:ix-x, in support of his claim that federal Judge Paul Cassell
terminated a deposition due to Jacob's former counsel asking "irrelevant
and harassing" questions. While Jacob adamantly denies that his former
counsel's questions in any deposition taken in this matter were
irrelevant or intended to harass anyone, Bezzant's record citations are
suspect. He cites R1285:5 does not exist, R1969:l 1 which is Bezzant's
own memorandum in support of his motion for partial summary
judgment, and R2463:ix-x, which is Bezzant's reply memorandum in
support of his motion for partial summary judgment.
Bezzant references the deposition testimony of AFC Mayor Ted Barratt
in support of his claim that both the Flyer and the Notice were
referenced in "a public City Council meeting after the publication of the
Editorial in the days before the election." Br. Appe. at 30. The
referenced testimony not only does not support Bezzant's assertions, it
rebuts them. When asked if he discussed the contents of the Notice with
anyone after receiving it, Barratt testified, "Not that I necessarily recall.
I may have spoken with Councilman Tom Hunter and Councilman Elect
Rick Storrs, but I don't recall those conversations at this time." R516,
Tab E, at 141. While there was some discussion in the press after the
election about the purported conflict of interest in relation to Hunter and
Storrs holding public office, as both Barratt and Storrs testified in their
depositions, this was never an issue of public debate in AFC Council
Meetings. R516,TabE, 141;R516,TabH, 100, 112, 129, 130, 152.

